Year: 2013
Type: article
Abstract: The Java virtual machine and the .NET common language runtime feature an access control mechanism specified operationally in terms of run-time stack inspection. We give a denotational semantics in "eager" form, and show that it is equivalent to the "lazy" semantics using stack inspection. We give a static analysis of safety, i.e., the absence of security errors, that is simpler than previous proposals. We identify several program transformations that can be used to remove run-time checks. We give complete, detailed proofs for safety of the analysis and for the transformations, exploiting compositionality of the eager semantics.
DOI: 10.4204/eptcs.129.17
Authors: Anindya Banerjee, David A. Naumann
Institutions: IMDEA Software Institute, Stevens Institute of Technology
Language: English
Subfield: Artificial Intelligence
Field: Computer Science
Domain: Physical Sciences
Open Access status: diamond
OpenAlex ID: W2052741406
