Year: 2009
Type: article
Abstract: Early warnings of the Rwandan genocide were ignored because policy makers perceived it as a "civil war," denied the facts, and decided not to intervene, preventing U.S. and U.N. lawyers from calling the killing "genocide." Early reinforcement of UNAMIR could have saved hundreds of thousands of lives, but "group-think" precluded consideration of direct military intervention by the U.S. and allied forces, though they were near Rwanda and rescued their own nationals. Unwilling to financially and militarily support a reinforced UNAMIR, the U.S., U.K. and U.N., the Security Council ordered UNAMIR to leave Rwanda; because they did not consider Rwandan lives worth saving at the risk of their own troops.
Author: Gregory Stanton
Institutions: University of Mary Washington, University of South Florida
Language: English
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2053325547
