The case for a populist Central Banker
Year: 1999
Type: article
Abstract: We present a general equilibrium optimizing model in which we study the joint effects of centralization of wage setting and central bank conservatism on economic performance. Several striking conclusions emerge. In relatively centralized labor markets employment and output are decreasing, and inflation is intially increasing and then decreasing, in the degree of central bank conservatism. A radical-populist central banker who cares not at all about inflation (alternatively, who is not conservative) maximizes social welfare. Economic performance is not U-shaped in the degree of centralization of the labor market, in contrast to conventional wisdom.
Source: European Economic Review
Authors: Vincenzo Guzzo, Andrés Velasco
Institutions: New York University, National Bureau of Economic Research
Language: English
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
Estimated APC paid: $3,690
OpenAlex ID: W2054131302
