Year: 2004
Type: article
Abstract: My concern here is to motivate some theses in the philosophy of mind concerning the interpersonal character of intentions.I will do so by investigating aspects of shared agency.The main point will be that when individuals act together one must be able to act directly on the intention of another or others in a way that is relevantly similar to the manner in which an agent acts on his or her own intentions.What exactly this means will become clearer once we understand what it is to act directly on one's own intentions.But I take it to be a fundamental assumption of the prevailing individualism of the theory of action-one at the core of its conception of the separateness of individuals -that one person cannot act directly on another's intention.I agree that there is an important way in which we are or can be separate and autonomous thinkers and agents.But the way the individualist tries to capture this separateness is misguided.Taking a participant's contribution to shared activity to be an exercise of individual agency, the individualist considers which acts of independent agents add up to instances of acting together, and tries to articulate the conditions under which they do.Acting together -so understood -is constituted by individual acts, and the theory and
Source: The Philosophical Review
Author: Abraham Sesshu Roth
Institution: University of Illinois Chicago
Language: English
Topic: Free Will and Agency
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: bronze
OpenAlex ID: W2055701662
