Indirect reciprocity, image scoring, and moral hazard
Year: 2005
Type: article
Abstract: Whether one-shot interactions can stably sustain mutual cooperation if they are based on a minimal form of reputation building has been the subject of considerable debate. We show by mathematical modeling that the answer is positive if we assume an individual's social network evolves in time. In this case, a stable mixture of discriminating and undiscriminating altruists can be proof against invasion by defectors. This sheds light on current discussions about the merits of different types of moral assessment, an issue where theoretical arguments and experimental findings seem at odds.Unexpectedly, our approach also relates to the proverbial observation that people tend to become more tightfisted with age.
Authors: Hannelore Brandt, Karl Sigmund
Language: English
Subfield: Sociology and Political Science
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2056000877