Work

Justice and the Assignment of the Intergenerational Costs of Climate Change

Year: 2009
Type: article
Abstract: Matters of intergenerational justice are fundamental to discussions of justice and climate change. This is the case for several reasons. We are confident that our emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) are having an effect on the global climate system. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change's (IPCC) six different climate models in their Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) predict global mean temperature increases ranging from 1.8°C to 4.0°C during this century.1 This is projected to increase global mean sea levels by 0.18 to 0.59 meters.2 The attendant weather changes are less certain, as is how they will vary from region to region. But some of the effects that AR4 predicts as very likely include hotter high temperatures, more frequent heat waves, and greater precipitation in high latitudes. Effects that it estimates as likely include decreased precipitation in the subtropics and increased intensity of tropical cyclones.3 The Third Assessment Report (TAR) warns of a weakening of the thermohaline circulation and its possible abrupt shutdown after 2100.4 Unlike TAR, however, AR4 does not discuss the probabilities of severe or catastrophic adverse effects. But this absence is the subject of controversy among climate scientists, some of whom charge that politically motivated redactions to AR4 occurred.5 The effects of anthropogenic climate change will produce costs for persons in the future who will have to adapt to the changes. Crops will need to be changed or farmers will have to move. For many people food security will be threatened; some will go hungry as a result; other will starve. Homes and communities will need to be moved as sea levels rise. Some houses will be wiped out by sudden extreme storms. TAR stresses the disproportionate costs of adaptation for lower-income populations and the risks to populations in low-lying coastal regions and small islands. In general it predicts that, “[t]he impacts of climate change will fall disproportionately upon developing countries and the poor persons within all countries, and thereby exacerbate inequities in health status and access to adequate food, clean water, and other resources.”6 A recent study indicates that more than six hundred million people (ten percent of the world's population) live in low lying areas at higher risk to sea-level rises, and this amount is expected to increase as the urbanization of the global population continues.7 The effects of climate change and the costs of adapting to it can be mitigated by our policy choices. Such choices will produce mitigation costs for us as they will require significantly different energy production and use policies. Cleaner sources of energy are more expensive. The relative costs of the alternative sources of energy can be brought down by increasing the costs of using fossil fuels. But an increase in the absolute costs of energy is then guaranteed. It is highly unlikely that there will be significant mitigation without incurring such increased costs. The costs of adaptation and mitigation apply to a number of activities satisfying very important human interests, such as transportation, heating and cooling, shelter, food cultivation and production, security, income, government, and recreation. The assignment of the costs of mitigation and adaptation then is an important matter of justice. The matter of justice is between generations. It takes time to reduce global CO2 emissions. We have no experience of doing so yet. But even if we begin reducing, the IPCC projects that CO2 concentrations in the atmosphere will continue to increase in the absence of very large emissions reductions.8 TAR holds that “[s]tabilization of CO2 concentrations at any level requires the eventual reduction of global CO2 net emissions to a small fraction of the current level.”9 The level at which CO2 concentrations are stabilized will establish the assignment of costs, a higher level will involve fewer mitigation costs but higher adaption costs. In any case, even after stabilizing atmospheric concentrations of CO2, surface air temperature will continue to rise by a few tenths of a degree per century for a century or more, and sea levels will continue to rise for many centuries.10 The matters of intergenerational justice canvassed above are fundamental to an account of justice and climate change because in the absence of an account of duties to future generations any global regulatory scheme for sharing the mitigation costs of climate change intra-generationally, a scheme such as that which the international community must devise as a successor to the Kyoto Protocol, will be morally blind. It would be like agreeing on the relative proportions that members of a criminal ring must pay back their victims without setting an overall amount. There would be no assurance that the regulatory scheme was just unless it was directed toward fulfilling duties to future generations. Taking a position on this question of intergenerational justice, by, say, setting an atmospheric CO2 concentration target, is, however, unavoidable in the establishment of a post-Kyoto institutional framework. In this paper, I shall examine proposals for the distribution of the intergenerational costs of climate change. Settling on the appropriate principle is a complicated task for several reasons. The difficulties include, among others, how to deliberate impartially with respect to intergenerational principles and how to take account of the interaction between the distributions of inter- and intra-generational costs. By means of arguments that I hope are appropriately sensitive to these complexities, I shall offer a qualified defense of a principle that assigns proportionally equal intergenerational costs. In discussing proposals for the intergenerational assignment of the costs of climate change, it is important to keep in mind that CO2 emissions are associated not only with costs—the cost of adapting to or mitigating climate change—but also with benefits—the benefits of industrial activity, transportation, modern farming, recreation, heating, and cooling. Although we will have to implement means for deriving these goods that involve far fewer CO2 emissions, it is nonetheless the case that ever since the industrial revolution the activities that have generated CO2 have also produced important benefits, capital, and consumer goods that we continue to enjoy and that future generations will enjoy. Any reduction in costs for future generations will incur costs for the present and near future, and therefore predictably a reduction in certain benefits for the present and future. This is important for two reasons. One is that it is unreasonable to consider only the costs that future generations will incur from emitting activities; one has also to consider the gains in wealth that accrue to them due to our industrial activity. The second is that in the absence of a significant change in the global institutional structure, the future poor can be expected to suffer heavily in the payment of adaptation costs; and unless we construct our regulatory institutions to avoid it, the opportunity costs of mitigation will likely be especially costly to those who are presently poor. In the end one cannot really get a moral grip on the intergenerational alternatives that we face without some discussion of the intra-generational assignment of the costs and benefits of adaptation and mitigation. The realization that the intra-generational assignment of the costs of mitigation and adaptation are also matters of justice significantly complicates any discussion of the assignment of the intergenerational costs of climate change. In order to attempt headway, I discuss these matters under three different scenarios. One scenario, which I call Continued Deep Inequality or CDI, assumes that although very modest gains will be made in addressing absolute poverty, along the lines of the First Millennium Development Goal, global inequalities and attendant severe poverty will continue for the rest of the century. My second scenario, Global Justice or GJ, assumes that global inequalities and attendant severe poverty are permanently eradicated in the very near future, in the time that it would take to arrive at a new international agreement on climate change and to establish the institutions for governing it. Thus, at the inception of the new CO2 emissions reduction regime the global order is substantially just. The third scenario, which I call Progressive Inequality Reduction or PIR, assumes long-term institutional change, producing significant decreases in inequality and attendant poverty, such that by the end of this century the global economy is significantly more just than it is now. I consider the following three principles for the assignment of the intergenerational costs of climate change: Future Optimality: Present energy policy should produce an optimal sum of the foreseeable future costs and benefits of CO2 emissions. Future Sufficiency: Present energy policy should produce a sum of foreseeable future costs and benefits of CO2 emissions that at least ensures the maintenance of just political and legal institutions. Intergenerational Equality: Present energy policy should produce foreseeable future (adaptation) costs of CO2 emissions whose proportion to overall future economic output is equal to the proportion of (mitigation) costs to output of the present generation. By equalizing the proportions of costs to economic output, Intergenerational Equality allows that future persons might have more absolute costs than present persons. This would be permissible if the economic growth that our policies produced contributed to greater wealth in the future. By focusing on proportional equality and not absolute equality, then the principle can take into account the benefits of economic growth, which might be the result of polluting activity. Future Optimality could be understood in either aggregate or per capita form. One reason to take it in the per capita form is to control for population growth. Another way to control for this is to limit its aggregate application to cases in which the population is the same size. Derek Parfit calls such a version of Future Optimality The Same Number Quality Claim or simply Q: “If in either of two outcomes the same number of people would ever live, it would be bad if those who live are worse-off, or have a lower quality of life, than those who would have lived.”11 Parfit's principle is, of course, of limited value precisely because of the unrealistic constraint that the comparison sets must contain the same population size. But it is nonetheless the most discussed version of Future Optimality in the literature on intergenerational justice. James Woodward has criticized Q because of its demandingness on members of the present generation.12 This concern is directly applicable to Future Optimality in either its aggregate or per capita form because both require present sacrifices to improve maximally the well-being of future persons. They repeat, and amplify as moral principle, a general historical trend that philosophers in earlier times viewed as deeply problematic, even to the extent of requiring a theodicy if a providential understanding of history were to be salvaged. Immanuel Kant worries that “earlier generations seem to perform their laborious tasks only for the sake of later ones . . . and . . . that only the later generations will in fact have the good fortune to inhabit the building on which a whole series of their forefathers . . . had worked.”13 G. W. F. Hegel more vividly imagines the costs that the providential account has to justify when observing that history resembles “the slaughter-bench at which the happiness of peoples, the wisdom of States, and virtue of individuals have been victimized.”14 One need not assume that God is directing history to be bothered by Future Optimality. It is morally troublesome because it seems incompatible withimpartiality with respect to generational membership. It takes the interest of future persons as counting for everything, and those of the present for nothing. Privileging the interests of future persons over the present is especially problematic according the PIR scenario (stated previously) in which poor people in the future are assumed to be less poor both absolutely and relatively than those who are presently poor. The problem with Future Optimality is that it runs afoul of our intuitions regarding impartiality. It is, however, easier to identify cases in which our intuitions about impartiality are violated than it is to understand clearly what impartiality requires. In most of the remainder of this essay this will be my concern. John Rawls's employment of the original position argument is a contractualist effort at modeling deliberative impartiality. It seeks an impartial outcome by means of procedural impartiality, in particular by the parties' absence of knowledge about various aspects of themselves—their location behind the veil of ignorance. Criticisms of contractualist approaches to intergenerational justice call into question whether there is such an approach that can advance our understanding of the requirements of impartiality in the context of intergenerational justice and even whether impartiality is a desideratum of intergenerational justice.15 In this section I distinguish three versions of a broadly Rawlsian approach and argue that one is useful for present purposes. To begin with, consider the requirements for fairness in the deliberation about principles of justice for the distribution of the costs of climate change. The point of an argument based upon hypothetical consent, in contrast to actual consent, is to insulate the outcome from the manner in which real-life privileges can distort the deliberative process. Given the global scope of climate change, an appropriate original position—if there is such—employed to justify duties of justice with respect to the costs of CO2 emissions necessarily would be cosmopolitan in seeking to prevent parties from bargaining on the basis of their citizenship status. Moreover, due to the intergenerational nature of the problem of climate change, the original position also would have to prevent strategic bargaining on behalf of one's own generation. Controversy, however, surrounds the manner of construction of an original position that could prevent distortions resulting from bargaining on behalf of one's generation. Because different constructions of the original position could lead to different principles being agreed upon, the controversy is material to understanding what intergenerational justice requires. Consider then the following three possibilities for constructing an original position for intergenerational justice: Intergenerational veil of ignorance and all possible persons. Parties in the original position are (or represent) all actual persons from the present generation and all possible persons from all future generations. They are subject to a deliberative constraint of a generational veil of ignorance that renders each of them ignorant of which generation is theirs.16 Intergenerational veil of ignorance and all actual persons. Parties in the original position are (or represent) all actual persons from the present and all future generations. They are subject to a deliberative constraint of a generational veil of ignorance that renders each of them ignorant of which generation is theirs.17 Present time of entry. Parties in the original position are (or represent) all actual persons from the present generation. They are subject to a deliberative constraint of a generational veil of ignorance that renders them ignorant of the place of the generation, of which they are all members, in history. They are also subject to the constraint that they must choose only a principle that they could endorse past generations as having chosen.18 The general idea of the original position is to model deliberative fairness so that the outcome of the deliberation is distinct and can be endorsed by everyone who accepts the moral importance of fair terms of deliberation. Different versions of the original position might be appropriate for different considerations of justice. In seeking to determine which version—if any—is appropriate, we ask ourselves not only which considerations ought not to influence deliberation, but also what manner of constraint can be put on deliberation to remove the unwanted influence. In actual deliberation we approximate impartiality when we rule out appealing reasons that could not be appealed to in the original positions due to its constraints. Each of the three proposals above seeks to prevent one from rejecting principles simply because they do not favor members of one's own generation. In order to determine which principle of intergenerational justice would be selected once such influences were removed, we must determine the most sensible manner of preventing the rejection of principles that do not favor one's own generation. Consider the first proposal. In this proposal parties are ignorant of whether they are (or represent) actual or merely possible persons. Parfit claims that one cannot deliberate on the assumption that one might not exist. “We can imagine a different possible history, in which we never existed. But we cannot assume that, in the actual history of the world, it might be true that we never exist. We therefore cannot ask what, on this assumption, it would be rational to choose.”19 Parfit's point is not, I think, meant to be a psychological one, such as the problems that some people encounter when trying to reason as if they did not know their gender. Nor, if we look at the second sentence of the quotation, is the problem only one of practical deliberation. It seems rather to be an epistemic or logical problem. We cannot assume about the actual world that we never existed. If this is correct, then merely possible persons gain no representation in the original position. Parfit does not elaborate on the point. So, consider two possible lines of reasoning in support of the view. The first is Cartesian: One's activity of imagining the world commits one logically to one's actual existence. This puts a constraint on how the actual world can be imagined. Although one might imagine oneself as deliberating about principles to apply in other worlds in which one does not exist, one cannot imagine not existing in the actual world. The second is based upon the idea that justice is meant to apply to the actual world and the claim that a necessary condition of the actual world is that all and only actual persons exist in it. If any actual person's is a necessary condition of the actual world, and if one cannot imagine what is logically then one cannot imagine actual persons not existing in the actual world. I do not know which of these lines of would however, seem to about the first version of the original position. So, the of impartiality I that they cannot require us to the interests of actual and possible persons. I then to the second manner of constructing the original position. This construction the problem of the first by (or only actual present and future. But there seems to be no way to arrive at principles on this Different principles will different institutional of energy production and the of these different institutional different people will have and the reasons that Parfit We cannot include actual future unless we assume an institutional But any scheme is in question so as the principles that would it are for deliberation. as the of the original position are meant to model our about justice, the of the charge is that in our about how to in order to our duties to future it no to that persons who will exist are deliberative impartiality it cannot over both persons and persons who will however, what to be this second version of the original position. they do not know their generation, the parties in the original in all and only those people from this will ever people who are and future people who do not exist but who one between the of persons and particular persons. which particular one is will determine which one we can distinguish these and that a person's out to be good or on and not on which particular is as that is, as distinct from which that future can be violated if our or institutions them as being that are to their account allows that the particular is on the principles but that interests are not a future person's it to that it is in or interest to be with certain rather than others, but it is not in or interest to be this particular one rather than that particular one of in a future person's be morally but which particular a future is the in is In to the that that in our about what we future generations we can distinguish between our of knowledge about who in particular will on the principles the interests that persons who will exist will would be if it to be a version of the original position that was of the problems canvassed But this does not seem to be the For either the original position only actual persons or If it does not then it possible future persons. It therefore has the problems of the first version of the original position. If it only actual persons from all then it is a account since the of persons of their from their interests is in on which principles are might that it is not but interests that are in the original position. But unless we persons to these interests there will be no and we do not then have a model for the impartial of There does not seem to be a deliberative constraint that as it future generations for in to what we Given the problems associated with the first two versions of the original seems to have been in Justice as to devise the original position along the lines of the third version for matters of intergenerational justice. to the other the third deliberation so as to establish impartiality, but the other two the third does not involve parties from future generations. It therefore does not contain the problem of either possible future persons deliberating or of the question about principles by only actual future persons. In the present time of although the parties are ignorant of their place in history, they know each other to be from the same and an principle is by the that parties can endorse its by generations. The important of this version is that we impartiality in our about intergenerational justice in by ourselves only to principles that we would it for generations to have an account of how to model deliberative intergenerational impartiality in I to the discussion of the principles of justice for the assignment of climate costs. In discussing within an original position the on the parties are to the present time of the members of the same subject to important They do not know the place of their generation in history. They must choose only a principle that they would as having all generations as They are to the well-being of members of other generations. They of costs for (or for those whom they as the veil of ignorance the rational of the goods in the intra-generational original so and condition that in the intra-generational original position there would be agreement on a of equality, but that from this to the principle would be rational the In the present case, and would parties to favor their own generation however, that do these out in the principles of Future and Intergenerational they lead to does the veil of ignorance in the case of intra-generational In deliberating about these principles I that Intergenerational Equality Future in other that by Intergenerational Equality future generations do at least as as they do by Future So, Future might the present generation to assume fewer costs of mitigation than does Intergenerational The between the principles when can be as a between more mitigation costs to costs between generations or the possible assumption of fewer costs so as only to that just institutions are possible in the future. But when it is a between fewer adaptation costs because earlier generations to or greater adaptation costs because generations only mitigated to just institutions. argument that the parties would Intergenerational Equality over Future as The parties would generations to have maximally mitigated their climate change adaptation costs. The parties would to the costs of mitigating future climate change. other being Intergenerational Equality the in the first Future the in the second The parties are to choose only the principle that they would earlier generations to have The parties are to Intergenerational I call this the equality two and are logically to the but they to the of the If were not there would be no rational for Intergenerational Equality over Future A deliberative would So, has the virtue not only of modeling impartiality but also of producing a I take the equality argument to be a for Intergenerational In it to that if we an impartial toward generational and thereby reasons that only to favor one generation over there is good reason to endorse the principle of Intergenerational which requires not climate change adaptation costs on future generations that are a greater of the overall economic output than the of the mitigation costs for the present generation. In the two I this principle by addressing to it. One might to the equality argument on that the deliberative constraint that parties must only the principle that they would earlier generations to have Future Optimality since any generation would that the ones maximally it. In section I that Future Optimality seems because the that it on those does not to our intuitions about the requirements of intergenerational impartiality. The present that condition does not in fact support our intuitions about intergenerational impartiality. This however, to that the original position of practical deliberation about a principle to the present generation in to future not a hypothetical of what present persons would have past persons to have So, although condition would not rule out Future Optimality if the parties were not deliberating about a principle to Future Optimality is out by the parties' rational
Language: English
Open Access status: bronze
OpenAlex ID: W2056547006
FWCI: 5.89
Cites: 7
Cited by: 40
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