Year: 1988
Type: conference-paper
Abstract: Most theories of presupposition implicitly assume that presuppositions are facts, and that all agents involved in a discourse share belief in the presuppositions that it generates. These unrealistic assumptions can be eliminated if each presupposition is treated as the belief of an agent. However, it is not enough to consider only the beliefs of the speaker; we show that the beliefs of other agents are often involved. We describe a new model, including an improved definition of presupposition, that treats presuppositions as beliefs and considers the beliefs of all agents involved in the discourse. We show that treating presuppositions as beliefs makes it possible to explain phenomena that cannot be explained otherwise.
Authors: Diane Horton, Graeme Hirst
Institution: University of Toronto
Language: English
Subfield: Artificial Intelligence
Field: Computer Science
Domain: Physical Sciences
Open Access status: bronze
OpenAlex ID: W2061668628