OpenAlex
PricingAboutJobs
Log inGet started
Work

An approximate truthful mechanism for combinatorial auctions with single parameter agents

HTML

Year: 2003
Type: conference-paper
Source: Symposium on Discrete Algorithms
DOI: 10.5555/644108.644144
Authors: Aaron Archer, Christos H. Papadimitriou, Kunal Talwar, Éva Tardos
Institutions: Cornell University, University of California, Berkeley
Language: English

Topic: Auction Theory and Applications
Subfield: Management Science and Operations Research
Field: Decision Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Keywords: combinatorial auctions, truthful mechanisms, incentive compatibility, randomized rounding, set packing, approximation algorithms, social welfare maximization, NP-hard problems

Open Access status: closed
OpenAlex ID: W2062373125
FWCI: 19.5
Cites: 20
Cited by: 153
Related to: 10
OpenAlex
Nonprofit
Open DataOpen Data
Open Source
Product
Search
Compare
Pricing
Repositories
Unpaywall
Unsub
Developers
API docs
Data snapshot
Status
Source code
Organization
About
Team
Testimonials
Brand
Jobs
Community
Help center
Contact
Events
Blog
Mailing list
Supporters
Legal
Privacy
Accessibility
Terms