Work

Bureaucrats or Politicians? Part I: A Single Policy Task

Year: 2007

Type: article

Abstract: This paper investigates the normative criteria that guide the allocation of a policy task to an elected politician versus an independent bureaucrat. The bureaucrat is preferable for technical tasks for which ability is more important than effort, or if there is great uncertainty about whether the policymaker has the required abilities. The optimal allocation of redistributive tasks is ambiguous, and depends on how the bureaucrat can be instructed. But irrespective of the normative conclusion, the politician prefers not to delegate redistributive policies. (JEL D72, D73, D82)

Source: American Economic Review

DOI: 10.1257/000282807780323578

Authors: Alberto Alesina, Guido Tabellini

Institutions: National Bureau of Economic Research, Harvard University, Centre for Economic Policy Research, Canadian Institute for Advanced Research, Bocconi University

Language: English

Topic: Game Theory and Voting Systems

Subfield: Economics and Econometrics

Field: Economics, Econometrics and Finance

Domain: Social Sciences

SDG: Peace, justice, and strong institutions

Open Access status: green

Funder: National Science Foundation