Work

The Political Paradox of Finance Capitalism: Interests, Preferences, and Center-Left Party Politics in Corporate Governance Reform

Year: 2006

Type: article

Abstract: A striking paradox underlies corporate governance reform during the past fifteen years: center-left political parties have pushed for pro-shareholder corporate governance reforms, while the historically pro-business right has generally resisted them to protect established forms of organized capitalism, concentrated corporate stock ownership, and managerialism. Case studies of Germany, France, Italy, and the United States reveal that center-left parties used corporate governance reform to attack the legitimacy of existing political economic elites, present themselves as pro-growth and pro-modernization, strike political alliances with segments of the financial sector, and appeal to middle-class voters. Conservative parties’ established alliances with managers constrained them from endorsing corporate governance reform.

Source: Politics & Society

DOI: 10.1177/0032329206293642

Authors: John W. Cioffi, Martin Höpner

Institutions: University of California, Riverside, Max Planck Society, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies

Language: English

Topic: Elite Sociology and Global Capitalism

Subfield: Sociology and Political Science

Field: Social Sciences

Domain: Social Sciences

SDG: Peace, justice, and strong institutions

Open Access status: green

OpenAlex ID: W2071186576

FWCI: 26.7

Cites: 51

Cited by: 171

Related to: 10