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Evolutionary stability of honest signaling in finite populations

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Year: 2013
Type: conference-paper
Source: IEEE Congress on Evolutionary Computation (CEC)
DOI: 10.1109/cec.2013.6557917
Authors: David Catteeuw, Bernard Manderick, The Anh Han
Institution: Vrije Universiteit Brussel
Language: English

Topic: Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
Subfield: Sociology and Political Science
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Keywords: honest signaling, evolutionarily stable strategy, finite population, population size, selection pressure, costly signaling, evolutionary game theory

Open Access status: closed
OpenAlex ID: W2076654090
FWCI: 1.04
Cites: 38
Cited by: 8
Related to: 10
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