Work

Price Regulation of Access to Telecommunications Networks

Year: 2003
Type: article
Abstract: ongoing supervision and pricing assessments that resemble regulation.In an already regulated telecommunications sector such additional regulation therefore comes naturally.Today, access and interconnection pricing are a paramount policy concern of telecommunications regulators.Historically, network access and network interconnection were important issues in telecommunications almost right from the start.Once long-distance telephony was feasible, networks had to be interconnected to provide end-to-end services.While such interconnection between adjacent networks is still important internationally, we concentrate on interconnection between telecommunications carriers that compete with each other and access of a carrier to the network of another.That interconnection and access are the key to competition in telecommunications became abundantly clear after the expiration of the original Bell patents, when competing networks emerged that were not interconnected.As a result, subscribers on the other networks could not be reached, forcing businesses to subscribe to several networks in order to reach their customers and be reachable by them.This was not a tenable long-run situation.However, it persisted until AT&T bought up patents for the best viable technology for longdistance services and refused to interconnect with its local rivals.As a result, the local rivals could not offer the same long-distance services as AT&T.Lack of interconnection thereby foreclosed the rivals and AT&T rapidly regained lost market shares.Thus, the lack of interconnection emerged as the major barrier to telecommunications competition and may have led to the subsequent regulation.Not surprisingly, when network competition reemerged in the 1970s, the legal battlefields were about access and interconnection.Again, AT&T refused to let the new rivals use its network for completion and origination of calls that would travel longdistance over the rivals' networks.Rather, it was access regulation that jump-started competition.Economists and economic ideas have had a large and sometimes conflicting impact on access and interconnection pricing policies.Examples include the Baumol-Willig efficient component pricing rule, which made headlines and was eventually rejected in New Zealand, while the controversial pricing method designed by FCC economists for unbundled network elements was 2 While incumbents with almost 100% market share have little to gain from the network externalities provided by entrants, entrants have everything to gain from the network externalities provided by the incumbent.
Institution: Boston University
Language: English
Open Access status: bronze
OpenAlex ID: W2076855380
FWCI: 24.55
Cites: 80
Cited by: 248
Related to: 9