Work

Correlation of Positive and Negative Reciprocity Fails to Confer an Evolutionary Advantage: Phase Transitions to Elementary Strategies

Year: 2013

Type: article

Abstract: Why do humans cooperate with other unrelated humans? Correlated use of both a ``reward'' and a ``punishment'' strategy has been thought to be an evolutionary force underlying our predisposition for cooperation: if others are kind to us, we are kind to them; if they are exploitive, we may stop cooperating or tend to punish them. Recent human experiments show, however, that individuals mostly use one strategy or the other, rarely both. Now, statistical physical simulations of an evolutionary game model lend significant support to these findings.

Source: Physical Review X

DOI: 10.1103/physrevx.3.041021

Authors: Attila Szolnoki, Matjaž Perc

Institutions: Institute for Technical Physics and Materials Science, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, HUN-REN Research Centre for Natural Sciences, University of Maribor

Language: English

Topic: Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation

Subfield: Sociology and Political Science

Field: Social Sciences

Domain: Social Sciences

Open Access status: gold

Estimated APC paid: $4,200

Funders: Fonds National de la Recherche Luxembourg, Javna Agencija za Raziskovalno Dejavnost RS