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The symmetric multiple prize all-pay auction with complete information

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Year: 1998
Type: article
Source: European Journal of Political Economy
DOI: 10.1016/s0176-2680(98)00029-9
Authors: Yasar Barut, Dan Kovenock
Institutions: Rice University, Purdue University West Lafayette
Language: English

Topic: Auction Theory and Applications
Subfield: Management Science and Operations Research
Field: Decision Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Keywords: all-pay auctions, complete information, Nash equilibrium, stationary distribution, expected revenue, auction design

Open Access status: closed

Funders: Purdue University, Universitat de Barcelona
OpenAlex ID: W2083174134
FWCI: 1.142
Cites: 24
Cited by: 202
Related to: 10
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