Governance and Merger Accounting: Evidence from Stock Price Reactions to Purchase versus Pooling
Year: 2008
Type: article
Abstract: This paper examines the effect of corporate governance on investor reactions to accounting choice in the context of accounting for business combinations. Using a sample of 324 recent stock swap acquisitions I find that, contrary to practitioners' belief that capital markets penalize purchase accounting, the opposite appears to be true; there is a negative and significant differential market reaction of approximately 4% for acquiring firms that announce pooling transactions. This return differential declines to negative 8% for firms with ineffective corporate governance. These findings are consistent with capital markets interpreting the choice of purchase accounting as a signal of management's confidence in the likelihood of a successful merger. This signal is particularly relevant when corporate governance is considered ineffective.
Source: European Accounting Review
Author: F. Asís Martínez-Jerez
Institution: Harvard University
Language: English
Subfield: Accounting
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W3123941690
