Cyber-physical attacks in power networks: Models, fundamental limitations and monitor design
Year: 2011
Type: conference-paper
Abstract: Future power networks will be characterized by safe and reliable functionality against physical and cyber attacks. This paper proposes a unified framework and advanced monitoring procedures to detect and identify network components malfunction or measurements corruption caused by an omniscient adversary. We model a power system under cyber-physical attack as a linear time-invariant descriptor system with unknown inputs. Our attack model generalizes the prototypical stealth, (dynamic) false-data injection and replay attacks. We characterize the fundamental limitations of both static and dynamic procedures for attack detection and identification. Additionally, we design provably-correct (dynamic) detection and identification procedures based on tools from geometric control theory. Finally, we illustrate the effectiveness of our method through a comparison with existing (static) detection algorithms, and through a numerical study.
Institution: University of California, Santa Barbara
Language: English
Subfield: Control and Systems Engineering
Field: Engineering
Domain: Physical Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2086609129