Year: 2014
Type: article
Abstract: We develop a dynamic equilibrium model of asset markets with adverse selection. There exists a unique equilibrium in which better quality assets trade at higher prices but with a lower price-dividend ratio in less liquid markets. Sellers of high-quality assets signal quality by accepting a lower trading probability. We show how the distribution of sellers' private information affects an asset's price and liquidity, how a change in that distribution can cause a fire sale and a flight to quality, and how asset purchase and subsidy programs may raise prices and liquidity and reverse the flight to quality. (JEL D82, G12)
Source: American Economic Review
Authors: Veronica Guerrieri, Robert Shimer
Institution: University of Chicago
Language: English
Topic: Economic theories and models
Subfield: Economics and Econometrics
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2088567725
