Limitations to interorganizational knowledge acquisition: the paradox of corporate venture capital
Year: 2009
Type: article
Abstract: By highlighting conditions under which viable interorganizational relationships do not materialize, we explore the limitations of interorganizational knowledge acquisition. In the empirical context of corporate venture capital (CVC), we analyze a sample of 1,646 start‐up‐stage ventures that received funding during the 1990s. Under a regime of weak intellectual property protection (IPP), an entrepreneur‐CVC investment relationship is less likely to form when the entrepreneurial invention targets the same industry as corporate products. In contrast, under a strong IPP regime, industry overlap is associated with an increase in the likelihood of an investment relationship. Our findings suggest that many relationships do not form because the corporation will not invest unless the entrepreneur discloses his or her invention, and the entrepreneur may be wary of doing so, fearing imitation. To the extent that a CVC has greater capability and inclination to target same‐industry ventures, such industry overlap would exacerbate imitation concerns under a weak IPP regime, yet facilitate an investment relationship under a strong IPP regime. Beyond CVC, this insight may explain patterns of other interorganizational relationships, including research and development alliances and technology licensing between start‐ups and incumbents. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Source: Strategic Management Journal
DOI: 10.1002/smj.781
Authors: Gary Dushnitsky, J. Myles Shaver
Language: English
Subfield: Finance
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2088627622