National Champions and Corruption: Some Unpleasant Interventionist Arithmetic
Year: 1997
Type: article
Abstract: We present a hold‐up model of investment where active industrial policy promotes both corruption and investment. Since corruption deters investment, the effect of industrial policy on investment is lower than when corruption is absent. We find evidence suggesting that corruption is indeed higher in countries pursuing active industrial policies. Policy implications are illustrated by decomposing the total effect of industrial policy into a positive, direct effect, and a negative, corruption‐induced effect. In the presence of corruption, the total effect of industrial policy on investment ranges between 84 and 56% of the direct impact. The magnitude of these corrections suggests that corruption considerations should not be absent from cost‐benefit analyses of industrial policies.
Source: The Economic Journal
Authors: Alberto Ades, Rafael Di Tella
Institutions: Goldman Sachs (United States), University of Oxford
Language: English
Subfield: Sociology and Political Science
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2089797611
