Year: 2005
Type: article
Abstract: Standard statistical measures of strength of association, although pioneered by Pearson deliberately to be acausal, nowadays are routinely used to measure causal efficacy. But their acausal origins have left them ill suited to this latter purpose. I distinguish between two different conceptions of causal efficacy, and argue that: (1) Both conceptions can be useful; (2) The statistical measures only attempt to capture the first of them; (3) They are not fully successful even at this; (4) An alternative definition based more squarely on causal thinking not only captures the second conception, but also can capture the first one better too.
Source: Philosophy of Science
DOI: 10.1086/508118
Author: Robert Northcott
Institution: University of Missouri–St. Louis
Language: English
Subfield: History and Philosophy of Science
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2096842717