Work

Absolute Majority Rules

Year: 2007

Type: article

Abstract: This article considers absolute majority rules, which require the affirmative vote of a majority of all those eligible to vote in the institution. I compare absolute majority rules to simple majority rules under which only those present and voting are counted, and to simple supermajority rules. Under plausible conditions, absolute majority rules prove superior. Absolute majority rules insure majorities against strategic behaviour by minorities and combine supermajoritarian effects with majoritarian symbolism.

Source: British Journal of Political Science

DOI: 10.1017/s000712340700035x

Author: ADRIAN VERMEULE

Institution: Harvard University

Language: English

Topic: Game Theory and Voting Systems

Subfield: Economics and Econometrics

Field: Economics, Econometrics and Finance

Domain: Social Sciences

SDG: Peace, justice, and strong institutions

Open Access status: green

OpenAlex ID: W2097389693

FWCI: 0.755

Cites:

Cited by: 16

Related to: 10