Work

Deposit Insurance and Lender-of-Last-Resort Functions

Year: 2000

Type: article

Abstract: We consider issues concerning the design of a banking system safety net when both a deposit insurer and a lender of last resort are present. In our model both entities have a role to play. Moreover, issues related to deposit insurance pricing are relatively unimportant in this context, whereas issues related to discount window access and pricing are not. We discuss when and why (or why not) a lender of last resort should lend liberally but charge high rates of interest. And, we raise the possibility that discount window policy may enhance or reduce the scope for multiplicity of equilibria.

Source: Journal of money credit and banking

DOI: 10.2307/2601194

Authors: Christopher Sleet, Bruce D. Smith

Language: English

Topic: Banking stability, regulation, efficiency

Subfield: Finance

Field: Economics, Econometrics and Finance

Domain: Social Sciences

Open Access status: green

OpenAlex ID: W2099150474

FWCI: 4.389

Cites: 20

Cited by: 44

Related to: 10