Work

Optimal Envy-Free Cake Cutting

Year: 2011

Type: conference-paper

Abstract: We consider the problem of fairly dividing a heterogeneous divisible good among agents with different preferences. Previous work has shown that envy-free allocations, i.e., where each agent prefers its own allocation to any other, may not be efficient, in the sense of maximizing the total value of the agents. Our goal is to pinpoint the most efficient allocations among all envy-free allocations. We provide tractable algorithms for doing so under different assumptions regarding the preferences of the agents.

Source: Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence

DOI: 10.1609/aaai.v25i1.7874

Authors: Yuga Cohler, John Lai, David Parkes, Ariel Procaccia

Institution: Harvard University

Language: English

Topic: Game Theory and Voting Systems

Subfield: Economics and Econometrics

Field: Economics, Econometrics and Finance

Domain: Social Sciences

Open Access status: diamond

OpenAlex ID: W2104418326

FWCI: 67.9

Cites: 49

Cited by: 91

Related to: 10