Year: 2013
Type: conference-paper
Abstract: We report the results of a large-scale measurement study of the HTTPS certificate ecosystem---the public-key infrastructure that underlies nearly all secure web communications. Using data collected by performing 110 Internet-wide scans over 14 months, we gain detailed and temporally fine-grained visibility into this otherwise opaque area of security-critical infrastructure. We investigate the trust relationships among root authorities, intermediate authorities, and the leaf certificates used by web servers, ultimately identifying and classifying more than 1,800 entities that are able to issue certificates vouching for the identity of any website. We uncover practices that may put the security of the ecosystem at risk, and we identify frequent configuration problems that lead to user-facing errors and potential vulnerabilities. We conclude with lessons and recommendations to ensure the long-term health and security of the certificate ecosystem.
Institution: University of Michigan
Language: English
Subfield: Information Systems
Field: Computer Science
Domain: Physical Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
Awards: CRI-IAD: Collaborative Research: Enabling Security and Network Management Research for Future Networks, EAGER: Understanding the Scope and Impact of Internet Information Manipulation, G2964887113, G5016818029, NeTS: Large: Collaborative Research: Measuring and Modeling the Dynamics of IPv4 Address Exhaustion, TWC: Frontier: Collaborative: Enabling Trustworthy Cybersystems for Health and Wellness, G7701414100
OpenAlex ID: W2104899073