Work

Lucky CEOs and Lucky Directors

Year: 2010

Type: article

Abstract: ABSTRACT We study the relation between opportunistic timing of option grants and corporate governance failures, focusing on “lucky” grants awarded at the lowest price of the grant month. Option grant practices were designed to provide lucky grants not only to executives but also to independent directors. Lucky grants to both CEOs and directors were the product of deliberate choices, not of firms’ routines, and were timed to make them more profitable. Lucky grants are associated with higher CEO compensation from other sources, no majority of independent directors, no outside blockholder on the compensation committee, and a long‐serving CEO.

Source: The Journal of Finance

DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2010.01618.x

Authors: LUCIAN A. BEBCHUK, YANIV GRINSTEIN, URS PEYER

Institutions: National Bureau of Economic Research, Harvard University, European Corporate Governance Institute, Centre for Economic Policy Research, Reichman University, Cornell University, INSEAD, INSEAD, INSEAD, London Business School

Language: English

Topic: Corporate Finance and Governance

Subfield: Accounting

Field: Business, Management and Accounting

Domain: Social Sciences

SDG: Peace, justice, and strong institutions

Open Access status: green

OpenAlex ID: W2107222289

FWCI: 133.2

Cites: 44

Cited by: 349

Related to: 10