Understanding Ownership Residual Rights of Control and Appropriable Control Rights
Year: 1995
Type: preprint
Abstract: We discuss the notion of ownership in economics, taking our point of departure in the Grossman-Hart-Moore property rights approach. We criticize the exclusive identification of ownership with residual rights to control in this approach, and argue that economic organization may be rendered determinate under complete contracting (contrary to the GHM approach). Crucially, we argue that under complete contracting, some control rights may be appropriable because of measurement and enforcement costs. This holds the key to a theory of ownership that is not dependent on the notion of residual rights to control, but rather relies on appropriable control rights. However, the two perspectives may be complementary rather than rival.
Authors: Kirsten Foss, Nicolai J. Foss
Institution: Copenhagen Business School
Language: English
Subfield: Economics and Econometrics
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2111152644