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When Self-interest is Self-Defeating: The Public Goods Experiment as a Teaching Tool

Year: 1994
Type: article
Abstract: This simple classroom experiment demonstrates many of the behavioral phenomena associated with the voluntary provision of a public good. The mechanics of the game are explained in detail and complete instructions are provided, as well as suggestions for follow-up lectures. Influences such as anonymous voting, persuasion, returns to free-riding, and duration of association can be explored in connection with concepts of incentives, individual rationality and group welfare. A number of variations and extensions can be used to incorporate prisoners' dilemmas, incentive compatible mechanisms, negative externalities, and Coasian bargaining.
Authors: Robert G. Nelson, Richard O. Beil
Institution: Auburn University
Language: English
Subfield: Safety Research
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2113095194
FWCI:
Cites: 17
Cited by: 8
Related to: 10