Understanding vision in wholly empirical terms
Year: 2011
Type: review
Abstract: This article considers visual perception, the nature of the information on which perceptions seem to be based, and the implications of a wholly empirical concept of perception and sensory processing for vision science. Evidence from studies of lightness, brightness, color, form, and motion all indicate that, because the visual system cannot access the physical world by means of retinal light patterns as such, what we see cannot and does not represent the actual properties of objects or images. The phenomenology of visual perceptions can be explained, however, in terms of empirical associations that link images whose meanings are inherently undetermined to their behavioral significance. Vision in these terms requires fundamentally different concepts of what we see, why, and how the visual system operates.
Authors: Dale Purves, William T. Wojtach, R. Beau Lotto
Language: English
Subfield: Cognitive Neuroscience
Field: Neuroscience
Domain: Life Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2113583161