Year: 1999
Type: article
Abstract: IntroductionThe traditional economic paradigm assumes that individuals are "rational," meaning they make optimal decisions based on the information available to them.In the field of assetpricing, the implications derived from this view, described in papers by Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) and others, are that prices reflect all available information, so that opportunities to earn extraordinary returns arise only from private information.According to this view, investors without special information, no matter how savvy they may be, cannot improve on the performance of index portfolios.1 The recent behavioral finance literature offers an alternative paradigm in which individuals make systematic mistakes in the way that they process information.In this paper, we consider one of these biases, that of overconfidence.There are a number of reasons why we concentrate on this particular bias: first, it is perhaps the best established of these biases.Second, we view it as a bias that is likely to manifest itself in the sort of analysis that is necessary in security valuation.Finally, we argue that overconfidence is a trait that is likely to arise through evolutionary selection.We believe this last argument is extremely important.Behavioral biases that distort decisions with no offsetting benefits are likely to be eliminated by natural selection.Hence, we should be considerably more skeptical about the existence of biases that cannot be explained in this way.Although many economists are sympathetic to the view that behavioral biases play a role in economic decisions, they generally believe that irrational investors have only a minor effect on prices.The standard argument is that, in competing to take advantage of the profit opportunities created by the trades of irrational investors, rational investors will push prices to a level where the profit opportunities virtually disappear.Thus, in the end, prices will be determined in the market "as if" all investors are rational.However, there is now considerable evidence at odds with this "as if" hypothesis.Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998) summarize this evidence and argue that, 1 Roberts (1967) and Fama (1970) lay out the definitions of weak, semi-strong, and strong-form efficiency.There is considerable evidence that is at odds with the strong-form efficient markets hypothesis that investors with private information cannot make extraordinary profits.When we refer to traditional market-efficiency, we mean semi-strong form efficiency.
Source: Financial Analysts Journal
DOI: 10.3386/w7489
Authors: Kent Daniel, Sheridan Titman
Language: English
Subfield: Finance
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2116339425
