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Simple versus optimal mechanisms

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Year: 2009
Type: conference-paper
Source: ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC)
DOI: 10.1145/1566374.1566407
Authors: Jason D. Hartline, Tim Roughgarden
Institutions: Northwestern University, Stanford University
Language: English

Topic: Auction Theory and Applications
Subfield: Management Science and Operations Research
Field: Decision Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Keywords: optimal auctions, single-item auctions, independent private values, second-price auctions, reserve prices, mechanism design

Open Access status: closed
OpenAlex ID: W2118442327
FWCI: 37.44
Cites: 11
Cited by: 432
Related to: 10
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