Misconceptions and Game Form Recognition: Challenges to Theories of Revealed Preference and Framing
Year: 2014
Type: article
Abstract: This study explores the tension between the standard economic theory of preference and nonstandard theories of preference that are motivated by an underlying theory of framing. A simple experiment fails to measure a known preference. The divergence of the measured preference from the known preference reflects a mistake, arising from some subjects’ misconception of the game form. We conclude that choice data should not be granted an unqualified interpretation of preference revelation. Mistakes in choices obscured by a possible error at the foundation of the theory of framing can masquerade as having been produced by nonstandard preferences.
Source: Journal of Political Economy
DOI: 10.1086/677254
Authors: Timothy N. Cason, Charles R. Plott
Language: English
Subfield: General Decision Sciences
Field: Decision Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2120902717
