Work

Misconceptions and Game Form Recognition: Challenges to Theories of Revealed Preference and Framing

Year: 2014
Type: article
Abstract: This study explores the tension between the standard economic theory of preference and nonstandard theories of preference that are motivated by an underlying theory of framing. A simple experiment fails to measure a known preference. The divergence of the measured preference from the known preference reflects a mistake, arising from some subjects’ misconception of the game form. We conclude that choice data should not be granted an unqualified interpretation of preference revelation. Mistakes in choices obscured by a possible error at the foundation of the theory of framing can masquerade as having been produced by nonstandard preferences.
Language: English
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2120902717
FWCI: 16.39
Cites: 78
Cited by: 324
Related to: 10