Do Procedures Matter in Fairness Allocations? Experimental Evidence in Mixed Gender Pairings
Year: 2011
Type: article
Abstract: Does the procedure of entitlement affect fairness perceptions? We use a dictator game to study the question in mixed gender pairs. In our experiments, we vary the process of entitlement across treatments. Allocators in our dictator game can inherit an amount without any effort, earn an amount with effort, or inherit an amount earned by a randomly matched partner's effort. We find subjects allocate lower amounts to their paired partners when they are dividing an amount that has been earned through their own effort and allocate relatively higher amounts when dividing an amount that has been earned through the paired member's real effort. Results also suggest that female proposers are more sensitive towards variations in entitlement processes.
Author: Utteeyo Dasgupta
Institution: Wagner College
Language: English
Subfield: Economics and Econometrics
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2121044579