Randomization with Asymmetric Information
Year: 1988
Type: article
Abstract: It is by now well known that, in the presence of moral hazard or adverse selection, randomization of insurance premiums and benefits may be Pareto efficient. This article provides a typology of the various forms that randomization may take, derives necessary or sufficient conditions for the desirability of these various forms of randomization, obtains some single characterization theorems of the efficient random policies, gives some intuition behind the results, and considers why randomization appears to occur less often in practice than the theory suggests it should.
Source: The RAND Journal of Economics
DOI: 10.2307/2555661
Authors: Richard Arnott, Joseph E. Stiglitz
Language: English
Subfield: Economics and Econometrics
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2122313279
