Year: 2013
Type: article
Abstract: Nihilism is the thesis that no composite objects exist. Some ontologists have advocated abandoning nihilism in favor ofdeep nihilism, the thesis that composites do not existO, where to existOis to be in the domain of the most fundamental quantifier. By shifting from an existential to an existentialOthesis, the deep nihilist seems to secure all the benefits of a composite‐free ontology without running afoul of ordinary belief in the existence of composites. I argue that, while there are well‐known reasons for accepting nihilism, there appears to be no reason at all to accept deep nihilism. In particular, deep nihilism draws no support either from the usual arguments for nihilism or from considerations of parsimony.
Source: Noûs
DOI: 10.1111/nous.12027
Author: Daniel Z. Korman
Institution: University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
Language: English
Subfield: Experimental and Cognitive Psychology
Field: Psychology
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
Funder: Australian Research Council
OpenAlex ID: W2128353252