Year: 2008
Type: other
Abstract: I present a unifying framework of banking in which banks both monitor their borrowers and provide liquidity to depositors.In this framework I review the role of several features of banks.I explain how diversification affects banks' monitoring incentives, which are particularly relevant for their role in lending.This asset-side perspective is quite prevalent in the banking literature, and is the main focus of this dissertation.I also analyze bank fragility issues that may lead to bank runs and regulatory resolutions designed to contain bank fragility.Moreover, I discuss the potential positive disciplining effect of (the threat of) fragility in mitigating moral hazard.In addition, this review discusses rationales for capital regulation and for banks to voluntarily hold capital.
Author: Matej Marinč
Language: English
Subfield: Finance
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2128935272
