Nash Networks with Heterogeneous Agents 1
Year: 2002
Type: preprint
Abstract: A non-cooperative model of network formation is developed. Agents form links with others based on the cost of the link and its assessed benet. Link formation is one-sided, i.e., agents can initiate links with other agents without their consent, provided the agent forming the link makes the appropriate investment. The model builds on the work of Bala and Goyal, but allows for agent heterogeneity. Whereas they permit links to fail with a certain common probability, in our model the probability of failure can be different for different links. We investigate Nash networks that exhibit connectedness and super-connectedness. We provide an explicit characterization of star networks and examine some other types of common network architectures. Efficiency and Pareto-optimality issues are discussed through examples. We also explore the consequences of three alternative specifications which address criticisms of such communication networks: As a first alternative a model of link formation is explored where ...
Authors: Hans Haller, Sudipta Sarangi
Language: English
Topic: Game Theory and Applications
Field: Decision Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2132206780
