Work

Fair Value Opinion Shopping

Year: 2015

Type: article

Abstract: ABSTRACT This study reports the results of an experiment designed to provide empirical evidence related to fair value opinion shopping. The experiment provides initial evidence that managers are likely to shop for fair value opinions from external valuation professionals in the absence of a requirement to disclose that behavior to the board or auditor. Disclosure becomes a meaningful deterrent when the beneficiary of opinion shopping is perceived to be the manager. However, disclosure is an ineffective deterrent when the beneficiary is perceived to be shareholders.

Source: Behavioral Research in Accounting

DOI: 10.2308/bria-51238

Author: Leigh Salzsieder

Institution: University of Missouri–Kansas City

Language: English

Topic: Auditing, Earnings Management, Governance

Subfield: Accounting

Field: Business, Management and Accounting

Domain: Social Sciences

Open Access status: green

OpenAlex ID: W2134281009

FWCI: 8.794

Cites: 74

Cited by: 18

Related to: 10