Work

Stackelberg Mixed Duopoly with a Foreign Competitor

Year: 2003

Type: article

Abstract: We investigate Stackelberg mixed duopoly models where a state‐owned public firm and a foreign private firm compete. We examine a desirable role (either leader or follower) of the public firm. We also consider endogenous roles by adopting the observable delay game of Hamilton and Slutsky (1990). We find that, in contrast to Pal (1998) discussing a case of domestic competitors, the public firm should be the leader and that it becomes the leader in the endogenous role game. We also find that in contrast to Ono (1990) eliminating a foreign firm does not improve domestic welfare in mixed oligopolies.

Source: Bulletin of Economic Research

DOI: 10.1111/1467-8586.00175

Author: Toshihiro Matsumura

Institutions: Institute of Social Science, The University of Tokyo, The University of Tokyo

Language: English

Topic: Merger and Competition Analysis

Subfield: Economics and Econometrics

Field: Economics, Econometrics and Finance

Domain: Social Sciences

SDG: Peace, justice, and strong institutions

Open Access status: green

OpenAlex ID: W2135339899

FWCI: 7.274

Cites: 34

Cited by: 178

Related to: 10