Communicating Frames in Negotiations
Year: 2012
Type: article
Abstract: The conundrum of communication in bargaining has been resolved only in part.While theorists and empiricists have come to agree that communication can enhance bargaining efficiency through honest revelation and coordination, the spirit of Farrell's conclusion from over two decades ago still holds: -The role of talk in games is still little understood (1988: 213).Given the opportunity, bargainers tend to over-communicate-to share more information, more honestly, than predicted in equilibrium.Speakers are more revealing than dictated by their economic interests and receivers place more weight on unverifiable information than theory suggests is rational (Blume & Ortmann, 2007;Cai & Wang, 2006).As a result, communication prior to or during bargaining tends to increase, though it cannot guarantee, outcome efficiency in games with private information (Crawford, 1990; Farrell &
Authors: Kathleen L. McGinn, Markus Nöth
Institutions: Harvard University, Universität Hamburg
Language: English
Topic: Game Theory and Applications
Field: Decision Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2136316232
