Work

Promoting Cooperation

Year: 2014

Type: book-chapter

Abstract: Recent work in experimental economics on the effectiveness of rewards and punishments for promoting cooperation mainly examines decentralized incentive systems where all group members can reward and/or punish one another. Many self-organizing groups and societies, however, concentrate the power to reward or punish in the hands of a subset of group members (‘central monitors’). This chapter reviews the literature on the relative merits of punishment and rewards when the distribution of incentive power is diffused across group members, as in most of the extant literature, and compares this with more recent work and new evidence showing how concentrating reward/punishment power in one group member affects cooperation.

Source: Oxford University Press eBooks

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199300730.003.0006

Authors: Daniele Nosenzo, Martin R. Sefton

Language: English

Topic: Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies

Subfield: Economics and Econometrics

Field: Economics, Econometrics and Finance

Domain: Social Sciences

SDG: Peace, justice, and strong institutions

Open Access status: green

Funders: Leverhulme Trust, University of East Anglia, Economic and Social Research Council

Awards: Network for Integrated Behavioural Science, G5403439870, G7342147324