Work

Fairness, envy, guilt and greed: Building equity considerations into agency theory

Year: 2015

Type: article

Abstract: In this article we examine the extent to which fairness considerations are salient to senior executives, and consider the implications for agency theory, tournament theory and the design of top-management incentives. We look for patterns in a unique data set of senior executive preferences and seek explanations for these patterns using a model of fairness first advanced by Fehr and Schmidt in 1999. We propose a number of amendments to Fehr and Schmidt’s model. We challenge some of the standard tenets of agency theory and tournament theory, demonstrating why equity considerations should be taken into account. We add to the growing literature on behavioural agency theory.

Source: Human Relations

DOI: 10.1177/0018726714554663

Authors: Alexander Pepper, Tom Gosling, Julie Gore

Institutions: London School of Economics and Political Science, PricewaterhouseCoopers (United Kingdom), University of Surrey

Language: English

Topic: Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies

Subfield: Safety Research

Field: Social Sciences

Domain: Social Sciences

SDG: Peace, justice, and strong institutions

Open Access status: green

OpenAlex ID: W2137993368