Collusive Bidder Behavior at Single-Object Second-Price and English Auctions
Year: 1987
Type: article
Abstract: Iluke C n t i e~aztj Models of'collusive bidder behavior at single-object second-price and English auctions are provided.1-he independent private values model is gerlerali~ed to permit the formation of coalitions and a strategic response by the auctioneer.Cooperative strategies are found to be donlinant in these models: coalitions of' any size are viable, and the payoff' to each member increases with the size of the coalition.In addition, the collusi\re strategies of'the coalition represent a noncooperative equilibrium.The optimal response of' the auctioneer is to establish a reserve price that is a function of the coalition's size.These and other features of the model are founci to be consistent with the essential features of actual behavior.' This is pr-ecisely correct at the second-pi-ice auction (see Vickre, 1961).At the Englihh auction the doi~iinant strateg) of a t~idder-is tu I-emain active until the bidding reaches his tl-ue \aluation.
Source: Journal of Political Economy
DOI: 10.1086/261512
Authors: Daniel A. Graham, Robert C. Marshall
Language: English
Field: Decision Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
Funder: National Science Foundation
OpenAlex ID: W2139311641
