Work

CEO Compensation and Board Structure Revisited

Year: 2012

Type: article

Abstract: ABSTRACT Chhaochharia and Grinstein estimate that CEO pay decreases 17% more in firms that were not compliant with the recent NYSE/Nasdaq board independence requirement than in firms that were compliant. We document that 74% of this magnitude is attributable to two outliers of 865 sample firms. In addition, we find that the compensation committee independence requirement increases CEO total pay, particularly in the presence of effective shareholder monitoring. Our evidence casts doubt on the effectiveness of independent directors in constraining CEO pay as suggested by the managerial power hypothesis.

Source: The Journal of Finance

DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2012.01744.x

Authors: KATHERINE GUTHRIE, JAN SOKOLOWSKY, KAM‐MING WAN

Institutions: George Mason University, University of Michigan, Hong Kong Polytechnic University, William & Mary

Language: English

Topic: Corporate Finance and Governance

Subfield: Accounting

Field: Business, Management and Accounting

Domain: Social Sciences

Open Access status: green

OpenAlex ID: W3125954083

FWCI: 84.03

Cites: 13

Cited by: 235

Related to: 10