Year: 1999
Type: report
Abstract: This paper considers a model where an insolvent bank raises the funds and lends regardless of project return.It is said that one of the purposes of promptly corrective action in Japan which was put in action in April, 1998 is to prevent such a lending.In this paper, we examine what kind of agents must loan funds to the insolvent bank with projects to lend in order to prevent it from inefficiently lending.We show that government deposit insurance agency (GDIA)'s loan can make the bank lending efficient although a large number of studies has emphasized the point that existence of GDIA gives a bank an incentive to take too much risk.We also show that efficient lending can be achieved irrespective of the total deposits to be insured.
Author: Toshiyuki Soma
Language: English
Subfield: Finance
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2141183442
