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Incentives and incomplete information

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Year: 1979
Type: article
Source: Journal of Public Economics
DOI: 10.1016/0047-2727(79)90043-4
Authors: Claude d'Aspremont, Louis-André Gérard-Varet
Institution: UCLouvain
Language: English

Topic: Game Theory and Voting Systems
Subfield: Economics and Econometrics
Field: Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Domain: Social Sciences
Keywords: incentive compatibility, incomplete information, mechanism design, group decision making, truth revelation, dominant strategy, budget balance, Bayesian mechanism design, personal beliefs, uniqueness property
SDG: Peace, justice, and strong institutions

Open Access status: closed
OpenAlex ID: W2143895421
FWCI: 20.2
Cites: 25
Cited by: 878
Related to: 10
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