Year: 2008
Type: report
Abstract: We develop and test an economic theory of insurgency motivated by the informal literature and by recent military doctrine.We model a three-way contest between violent rebels, a government seeking to minimize violence by mixing service provision and coercion, and civilians deciding whether to share information about insurgents.We test the model using panel data from Iraq on violence against Coalition and Iraqi forces, reconstruction spending, and community characteristics (sectarian status, socio-economic grievances, and natural resource endowments).Our results support the theory's predictions: improved service provision reduces insurgent violence, particularly for smaller projects and since the "surge" began in 2007.
DOI: 10.3386/w14606
Authors: Eli Berman, Jacob Shapiro, Joseph Felter
Language: English
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
Funders: U.S. Department of Defense, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, United States Agency for International Development, World Bank Group, Yale University, University of Michigan, University of California, San Diego, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, U.S. Military Academy, Air Force Office of Scientific Research
Awards: G1523888516, G239888052, G5601911824
OpenAlex ID: W2144134384