Year: 2008
Type: article
Abstract: The years since September 11, 2001, have been heady ones for historians of U.S. foreign relations. Enrollments in our courses have exploded, and we have been eagerly sought after by the media. Our expertise in things past evidently provides us with the credentials to provide expert commentary on the present. This problematic relationship notwithstanding, for those of us who write about policymakers and policymaking, the events of the recent past fit comfortably within the boundaries of our scholarship. We dissect the processes by which those who manage U.S. foreign relations and national security receive and assess advice and information. In theory, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and other components of the intelligence community (IC) provide much of the grist for the policymakers' mill. Good strategic intelligence (the “big picture”) does not guarantee good policy, but, holds the received wisdom, the better the intelligence, the more informed the policymaker. Hence the better are the chances for formulating good policy, however one defines “good.” The converse is less ambiguous: bad intelligence all but assures ill-informed policy and dramatically increases the likelihood of “bad” policy. Different administrations connected the dots differently, but they all connected them somehow. Or so I thought.1 My efforts to decipher the policymaking process and the contributions of intelligence to it drove my forays into the hybrid field of political psychology.2 Most recently concentrating on cognitive dynamics, I studied attribution theory, schema theory, prospect theory, and all kinds of different heuristics and biases. What I learned by this poaching from another discipline is invaluable to any examination of the use of intelligence or, more precisely, intelligence assessments, which are wholly dependent on perception, inference, and interpretation. Yet although invaluable, what I learned also complicates those examinations. By doing so, it complicates the narrative of Cold War history.3 A cardinal principle of cognitive psychology is that once we form a belief, or are predisposed to believe something, we are loath to qualify let alone discard it. We “process” new information that we receive as consistent with and confirming a preexisting belief or image. If we cannot block inconsistent information from reaching us, we interpret it as inconclusive and ignore it. There are, of course, occasions when new information is so discordant with our preconceptions that we cannot discount it. On most of these occasions we discredit it. Or, because our beliefs are invariably related to others, and our mind organizes them hierarchically, we “allow” discordant information to disconfirm those beliefs that are of lower priority. Our core beliefs remain intact.4 The above summary does not do justice to the complexity of these theories, nor does it take into account emotion, stress, and other exogenous stimuli that influence our cognitions. The implications for historians of foreign policy are, nevertheless, apparent. One need not consider oneself a “realist” to presume that, particularly after the enactment of the National Security Act in 1947, the policies and strategies developed and recommended by managers of America's national security reflected to a substantial degree the intelligence about both allies and enemies that they received from their sources, even if that intelligence was “buffered” by ideology, racial bias, cultural norms, and associated phenomena. “By following evidence-based logic,” writes a consultant to the intelligence community, “an objective [intelligence] analysis holds the potential to debunk a policymaker's preconceptions, even reveal how his preferred policy actually fails.” Cognitive theory provides a severe challenge to that presumption.5 This is not to say that intelligence concerning all matters of policy is or has been accessible. Frequently, policymakers must proceed from estimates based on very little information. During his briefing to the National Security Council (NSC) early in the Eisenhower administration, for example, Allen Dulles conceded that the CIA's intelligence about the Soviet Union suffered from “shortcomings of a serious nature,” a concession well supported by the history of Soviet-American relations throughout the Cold War. One would accordingly predict a correlation between the quality of the intelligence received and the quality of the strategy (if not policy). Yet it does not seem much of a stretch to credit policymakers before, during, and after the 1950s with proceeding logically from what they had to work with.6 Formulating policy and strategy logically is one thing; formulating it rationally is another. During the formative years of both the NSC and the CIA, scores of individuals from the Executive Office of the President, the cabinet, and the national security community labored hard and diligently to improve the intelligence product and its delivery to the consumer. Congress authorized vast sums of money to develop technological means to improve intelligence-gathering capabilities. There were commissions, reports, and reorganizations. Yet one cannot spend decades studying the Cold War without wondering whether all these reforms and improvements really mattered. If policymakers were predisposed to believe, whatever the origins of that belief, that Ho Chi Minh was a pawn of the Soviets, or the Communist Chinese, or whomever, did it make a difference that the CIA was unable to provide confirming evidence or, for that matter, whether it provided disconfirming evidence? How receptive were they to alternative explanations? “Part of our job is to tell the emperor he has no clothes,” an intelligence official recently explained. He leaves unaddressed the question of whether the emperor, certain that he is sartorially have that question unaddressed as decades we in the and to a to the of scores and scores of National Intelligence National Intelligence and more recently the and other which we predict the of policymaking, the that connected to the is a even that the intelligence received drove a on national as the Cold War was that when all is and that little to that Cold A recently of and Soviet intelligence did not in principle early but that intelligence was to and of Cold War This little to the relationship of intelligence to the national security policies of the Cold War The and on the intelligence by with the about make an examination as well as Most of us we would to the of events that I that a of us, the most the of the for of even if we the that this a We have had with the when we the and I of us the about the between and we to the Security Council in by a of of what a evidence that to mind what a CIA to the the of the We also in the What is the from were so that the that the evidence was less this was the between the of and the National Security The its by and in the of a to the The for the was more intelligence to provide information on The they are the must to our the those who this but to There it Intelligence drove and strategy was on Yet we that the did not use the or it did not what defines We also that it the to did not consider the intelligence that it did and evidence if it let alone preexisting this but for different from those in the to the that of us write about the September 11, the and of and with the of to the for relations with the the and much intelligence did not Or it did not in the one would it mattered. The question is and to that I within the of the history of the Cold War and the and the between strategic intelligence, policy, and the more question to is whether as historians we have the administration, and the to have Or to the question differently, when if the Cold War and its to the did intelligence to the of a foreign or security policy of an in this means that a policy from what it would have been had the CIA not been in that the CIA is for this question Intelligence need not disconfirm a or preexisting belief in to or evidence is no less that which or because intelligence in the is to the product of the no how well informed that cannot in of if is a policy or when to the intelligence or Yet if one and by the history of the Cold one about what the from the that those intelligence and has mattered. the Cold the is the was intelligence, by of which a and his national security that CIA not his was when he that the had Intelligence was also to the of other Cold War or to use the that information the CIA received from the Soviet even if to provide of the of the to his of the intelligence estimates to his that in the U.S. On a what was in the of and in on estimates of Soviet Intelligence and in a even if we to the of in was the of the CIA, not the In what the provided the with intelligence, and also on to that to and to was not the of the CIA that the of and the has with a to the the contributions of which to Cold War history remain and cannot to intelligence, intelligence has the and of the of national security policy, or on intelligence and analysis are and they this to administration, of how political or we it. of whether of the policy or strategy the quality of the strategic are or one of the Office of National conceded more a that intelligence has had little on the policies the he them to the their and they more or less it this are the very of the Cold War. The CIA into in to improve America's for to its those by the Soviet the of the the Central Intelligence and a with the of and other to the enactment of the National Security he his when the National Intelligence by in and of his with the of and (the the of Central Intelligence was a to the Office of and for the and of In to intelligence, national intelligence, or its intelligence was intelligence, in which is by the and other and to them in policies with to national and security in and and for the of national policy. is in that of to more one must and must the of any one the National Security Act of the CIA even as it the as well as the it the of national Yet national security policy, with the strategy of reflected the CIA's What it did was the product of in on the Soviet who had recently his and was to the U.S. in as the consultant on it. and the that Soviet Union an with the and its objective it the to for an By the the on the need for and the to a on national had the and as its What is the CIA had to develop expertise on Soviet to as after the CIA's and the of the Cold in Soviet and these but had any and one had a had no degree the expertise or the to challenge or even of the Soviets, the of national security reflected his not the for from his the he it influence on the policies of the that of the CIA did of that NSC the of the Soviet as no that no did this policy in the NSC with more by the intelligence after the and the to to for the CIA, its were in the the as its the of intelligence for which was to to the its strategic The or it and but from the CIA's to the Soviet of an and the of the what little Hence the CIA's in the of the NSC was no it had been with NSC in as U.S. to in had much more in had to the not the CIA, that the was no political by a but of the of and of in the of the the as the to the of its and its and their by an and to and from the NSC did the CIA as its for estimates of the capabilities. Yet after that the CIA based its on it the implications for to the CIA's of the has not any in Soviet policy or The has the into its and as his in a that no of the recent Soviet not a and but they a that is on this no to that the would in the make a between and of NSC did not make this that the on what means the to its of were of and the on its to were of did the CIA in the that when NSC the of his The the of the Soviet the The was a NSC was an that reflected the of of not those of the the of the CIA to policymaking to the and The was and the was it was by with if not better and the was in his Yet the of these the to was to the of the to a more more and more national strategy had In doing so he was much more of CIA In the it did not much There is a and on his of the national security and his to all of the NSC the of national security that was and to NSC in my the most and well informed of any in U.S. I not that it the CIA as the of strategic Eisenhower all his in one and the CIA had much to The had from the to it by his Allen was of and was a more CIA in the policymaking process was the the Soviet Union on America's in and the and in its had little to work with in to a Allen Dulles would a the CIA was but one of of intelligence on which Eisenhower he did on as well as other informed and The of by the the NSC and the and In was the and The with to all intelligence, strategic of The NSC and all this advice and information in following and of the most and Eisenhower on a new of National Security NSC security strategy was better informed by intelligence Allen to the strategy was better informed does not that it was better that it had a better likelihood of good In the of Eisenhower in the nevertheless, it is so to the dots that one cannot but if not the that this of intelligence much of a difference The and the into did national security managers and and even have a of Yet I have been to a of evidence by the CIA and other that he really was the During years in the which as for his he developed beliefs about the of national the to the and of the the and so of the other that the He also developed beliefs about the of On the he well informed on the most but not to the of America's the relationship between and and the and of and He with a of strategic The strategy he of the intelligence, to One that intelligence and all that its and a by confirming This was with to his to the and the of a and Yet even if and CIA did a in confirming what Eisenhower did he need the for example, have his about the security of America's based on a different theory that he would and I no to that it was to evidence of estimates of Soviet this the intelligence were Eisenhower with cognitive to the estimates consistent with his beliefs reflected the and discard to them from the that America's strategies and policies the early years of the Cold War were more by the preexisting beliefs of and by intelligence and I not that the process was with because the was more in with Yet his to with and is but not nor let alone had any to quality provided them with to their The quality the Eisenhower and it was for a priority. was no need for to in to his he did not to this or did that Eisenhower is that no one from the intelligence community of a as a that was because was no one from the intelligence community who not the of U.S. intelligence in the did the of intelligence the between and the by cognitive processes is a the implications of the which are more this the to the we with the in or more the War the War. the CIA, with other of intelligence on was about its and the has been for well is that, with the of the of Intelligence and from the of America's the CIA was more any other or about the for an however was any the and Eisenhower its with to the of a and of were as was the in other of policymaking, its was provided its estimates and by as policymakers of Allen Dulles as following the of this and in about intelligence analysis more did but by he was in his to his intelligence This as in as it did in the of the Office of National and its in the of he that in the was the of the from the not his it so did the CIA's influence on after the a of a new in before, the was not about those before, when he it. He with the of and in the He to those who in and the What drove a He did not political and he did not challenge the CIA's In all likelihood he had in the CIA, or more in had early about the of Soviet in he did have in his his a the of as for was that the was as believe that the Communist has been and that the is the of in did not predict it did that the past that the and that in the of and in security in the By in to the CIA's of intelligence a the that psychology with One is to that as a of this and the intelligence did would a is no evidence that the policy (the were on but also the of the was well those who as to the CIA that much more so did He the and by he had with and its that and the more of was not a the in the between of in and his to the U.S. the of the nor did In to as his He it as his for they and an intelligence The were for their political the and the In the and a to the a between the CIA and the the the of Intelligence to and and as and and political the CIA's that in in the of more the In a CIA by and to to a the of to who had an had supported the CIA's by by the of of and and that would the of the strategy of and a he in on of the Intelligence for the for in had conceded to what one CIA the (the and the for it the of the between and was how the CIA its that the had the of in the nevertheless, to that the was and of an reports, in the of “an little on the or that the by that when in the of that to for an U.S. would not the of in that had the The of this is that intelligence in the of policy to the that it that policy, policy that the was predisposed to and to beliefs and political into the the that for this not even was disconfirming the without During the and and their security to use and intelligence on their their had no use for of intelligence other his The who relations with the CIA as with from from the The of the CIA as for a challenge from the a CIA official who had received from the from within the because he the to the to with to Intelligence as his intelligence the and in to to who that the CIA the Soviet He a between a A of CIA and a by and to a more on the of as a the of Soviet and to the it the The Soviet for the that the Soviet had both to and influence was less the The in who had the in of and and all of the of the CIA to use was predisposed to believe it. By his and the of and and Soviet expert who was for his of Soviet but on the he more from his and the he with the disconfirming the for a of was that they were to the of intelligence with little or no strategic intelligence have most to its when the CIA's was the The of the of the to in to Yet beliefs about were in and he was about so things that is no what difference a more would have of the to which one intelligence with policy it is the The is that policies based on their preexisting and their in this the strategic of the administration, although the most and most of this is consistent with its the most of the between and political and his of national security by and his and by National Security that America's security that the CIA, for which the a well or was that were to an as to an developed the history to the of that the of America's example, to their of the a more and did that in were to the to the a on the need for for delivery on September 11, after the of that with the did that had been to that was to the “big his that he not “process” the and the were the of the was it for what as the strategic in U.S. history the from to U.S. to the to to the of the U.S. to the to for the of we our what is is that the One was to The other was his or efforts to a of The the between and received no in the were and by CIA that intelligence the was that was no evidence has since to What has since is evidence that nor nor nor the when with evidence that into question this they and and the intelligence to of and for The of is more the a without the of an to although the CIA's estimates did not the to they did not it The the and a which less from its intelligence strategic as the to the U.S. it had one in and to On its intelligence was what it in sources, the is when the to political and in September the National Intelligence Council to a to an the which the of the most in the history of so and as to it from the that was no and the was based on and one that the that was an or that we with what he I was with and A was more was no more with the that the he was with a to a by the that its intelligence did not about to from to a The was certain that was as it and it was even to take matters into its Yet it a that intelligence to policy. the of the and summary of its that the and the less on the CIA to of a so as to to the that he and his in the intelligence is the of evidence that any official his or to the so and that they to a from the CIA to the intelligence to the from and the of this Office of The the in the of a by the predisposed to a relationship between and and were not supported by the not that the that of the CIA and other in what to use an intelligence the by the of of for he in his was to have to this his and and the have their and their or were The CIA's have as a on the The the degree of the and the kinds of the as for a that was a the evidence that the of the question of whether that their they evidence of and the its to the that would have the have to this cognitive the intelligence as much as the consumer. that because he once had must have had the of the things to do in the of intelligence is to has been to predict the the The if not the of the CIA's and the is were all but was also all but that the in the of one U.S. what he by of a the of hard the intelligence to on the they had that the was a in the that of was by who to as a The influence would have been no had it a better job the of by doing what intelligence What is it would have been no even had and so not the CIA's in Soviet in the in the and in the as evidence of its In of the need to the of once and for with the had by the of 2001, and the of to the they the need to to and they to Yet I credit the with following their What drove their policies were beliefs that into not intelligence that is is most about U.S. intelligence on is not that it things and it is that it so a in one of the most U.S. policy in recent writes a intelligence who intelligence not to but to a of the the CIA in in the of one as of The its in the CIA had after and what it has had since its the of policy, particularly security policy. after the history of what is more a both the on Intelligence and the I this more to the intelligence the intelligence policy and to my early as the CIA of the potential for a of which it in with that would as not the was to in and the of these would in an of also the of a in to of even as it the and influence of and the of The of no to these The has been to the it well take even a U.S. to an or that a U.S. intelligence is we have all the on and reforms of the intelligence their for the CIA and the other and within the Office of the of National Intelligence and Yet even if they are, the on policy is to so as the of that policy remain and Our in political have these and One must nevertheless, whether the that to the of the or a as the political his or to information and advice that is discordant with his or preexisting and even beliefs or the that beliefs are How is one must for those who are to from intelligence once in that these beliefs are this examination to those with the of the
Source: Diplomatic History
Author: Richard H. Immerman
Language: English
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: bronze
OpenAlex ID: W2145812067