Work

On The Robustness of Majority Rule

Year: 2008

Type: article

Abstract: We show that simple majority rule satisfies five standard and attractive axioms—the Pareto property, anonymity, neutrality, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and (generic) decisiveness—over a larger class of preference domains than (essentially) any other voting rule. Hence, in this sense, it is the most robust voting rule. This characterization of majority rule provides an alternative to that of May (1952).

Source: Journal of the European Economic Association

DOI: 10.1162/jeea.2008.6.5.949

Authors: Partha Dasgupta, Eric Maskin

Institutions: University of Cambridge, Institute for Advanced Study

Language: English

Topic: Game Theory and Voting Systems

Subfield: Economics and Econometrics

Field: Economics, Econometrics and Finance

Domain: Social Sciences

Open Access status: green

Funder: National Science Foundation

OpenAlex ID: W2146296985