Work

Between cheap and costly signals: the evolution of partially honest communication

Year: 2012

Type: article

Abstract: Costly signalling theory has become a common explanation for honest communication when interests conflict. In this paper, we provide an alternative explanation for partially honest communication that does not require significant signal costs. We show that this alternative is at least as plausible as traditional costly signalling, and we suggest a number of experiments that might be used to distinguish the two theories.

Source: Proceedings of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences

DOI: 10.1098/rspb.2012.1878

Authors: Kevin J. S. Zollman, Carl T. Bergstrom, Simon M. Huttegger

Institutions: Carnegie Mellon University, Santa Fe Institute, University of Washington, University of California, Irvine

Language: English

Topic: Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation

Subfield: Sociology and Political Science

Field: Social Sciences

Domain: Social Sciences

Open Access status: bronze

Funder: National Science Foundation

Award: Collaborative Research: Dynamic Perspectives on Costs and Conflict in Signaling Interactions