Year: 2006
Type: article
Abstract: In many principal-agent environments, the two parties hold different prior beliefs \nregarding the agent's future preferences. These differences may be due to inherent biases \nsuch as over-optimism or over-pessimism. We analyze the principal's optimal contract \ndesign under the assumption that the agent's prior is private information. In order \nto screen the agent's prior, the principal devises a menu of contingent contracts, some \nof which are 'speculative' as they involve betting on the agent's future action. We \ncharacterize the optimal menu and show that the characterization enables us to interpret \nreal-life contract design in a variety of economic contexts.
Source: TSpace (University of Toronto)
Authors: Kfir Eliaz, Ran Spiegler
Institutions: Brown University, University College London
Language: English
Field: Decision Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
Funder: National Science Foundation
OpenAlex ID: W2146757753
